Death by a Thousand Cuts: The Rule against Perpetuities by Vallario, Angela M.
Journal of Legislation
Volume 25 | Issue 2 Article 3
February 2015
Death by a Thousand Cuts: The Rule against
Perpetuities
Angela M. Vallario
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/jleg
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journal of Legislation at NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of
Legislation by an authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact lawdr@nd.edu.
Recommended Citation
Vallario, Angela M. (2015) "Death by a Thousand Cuts: The Rule against Perpetuities," Journal of Legislation: Vol. 25: Iss. 2, Article 3.
Available at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/jleg/vol25/iss2/3
Death By A Thousand Cuts:
The Rule Against Perpetuities
Angela M. Vallario*
I. Introduction
Much too familiar to us all is Professor John Chipman Gray's theorem on the
Rule Against Perpetuities (the Rule) that no interest is good unless it vests or fails
within a life in being plus 21 years.' However, a recent trend has begun among juris-
dictions to statutorily abolish the Rule for contingent interests in trusts with private
beneficiaries. Currently, seven jurisdictions: Maryland,2 Illinois,3 Alaska,4 Delaware,'
South Dakota,6 Wisconsin" and Idaho8 have abolished the Rule Against Perpetuities.
The abolishment of the Rule Against Perpetuities encourages settlors to create contin-
gent interests in trusts that will last forever. These trusts are sometimes referred to as
"dynasty" trusts.9
The legislation provides wealthy settlors with transfer tax advantages and allows
jurisdictions to remain competitive in the trust capital business.' The abolishment
legislation at first glance appears advantageous because it has transfer tax advantages
for wealthy settlors, yet the ability of settlors to exercise dead hand control could have
devastating affects on trust beneficiaries and the community at large. Dead hand con-
trol interferes with the marketability of trust assets and perpetuates the concentration of
wealth."
This article suggests the policy and social justifications against dead hand control
far outweigh transfer tax advantages provided to wealthy settlors and the potential
revenue expected to be generated by the abolishment legislation. The abolishment
legislation may be readily adopted by other jurisdictions in light of the legislatures'
failure to recognize the consequences of unlimited dead hand control.
This article recognizes that the Rule is complicated, 2 and Rule violations pres-
A*gela M. Vallario is a Visiting Assistant Professor at Howard University School of Law;
B.S. University of Florida; J.D., University of Baltimore; LL.M. (Taxation) Georgetown University Law
Center.
1. JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPErUDES 191 (4th ed. 1942).
2. MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 11-102(e) (Supp. 1998).
3. 765 ILL COW. STAT. 305/2-6 (West 1993 & Supp. 1998).
4. ALASKA STAT. § 34.27.050(a)(3) (Michie 1998).
5. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 503(a) (Supp. 1998).
6. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 43-5-8 (Michie 1997).
7. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 700.16 (West 1997 & Supp. 1998).
8. IDAHO CODE § 55-111 (1994).
9. This article will focus on the irrevocable dynasty trusts designed to benefit multiple benefi-
ciaries for numerous generations. It is created to last forever and avoids the rule against perpetuities.
10. The Delaware preamble states that Delaware's abolishment legislation was enacted to "[k]eep
Delaware competitive in the trust capital." Jesse Dukeminier, Dynasty Trusts: Sheltering Descendants
From Transfer Taxes, 23 EST. PLAN. 417, 422 (1996) [hereinafter Dukeminier, Dynasty Trusts).
11. See infra Part V.C.I-2.
12. See infra note 13; however, some scholars note that there are other areas within American
law far more complex than the Rule. Raymond C. O'Brien, Analytical Principle: A Guide for Lapse,
Survivorship, Death Without Issue and the Rule, 10 GEO. MASON L. REV. 383 (1988).
Journal of Legislation
ent harsh consequences for practitioners and their clients. In fact, violations of the
Rule, due to its complexity, have been held as an attorney error, not subject to a mal-
practice claim.' 3 The complexities of the Rule and the harsh consequences for the
violations thereof, initiated and resulted in the variations of reform.
American reform doctrines, such as the "wait and see", Uniform Statutory Rule
Against Perpetuities (USRAP) and cy pres have altered the strict requirements of the
Rule. The reform doctrines make determinations as to the vesting of contingent inter-
ests based on actual events ("wait and see"), 4 extend the vesting period to ninety
years (USRAP) 5 or permit equitable reformation to fix Rule violations (cy pres). 6 A
vast majority of the jurisdictions have adopted one form or another of the reform doc-
trines. 7 Even so, the common law Rule remains in twenty-one jurisdictions."
A brief discussion of the origin of the Rule, basic elements and the modem
reform, are useful for a fuller understanding of this article's critique of the abolishment
legislation. After the brief discussion of the Rule and reform, this article categorizes
the abolishment legislation as the 1998 abolishment legislation;"' the additional-incen-
tive jurisdictions 20 and the forerunners of abolishment.2  After categorizing the abol-
ishment legislation, this article compares the arguments against the abolishment leg-
islation to its advantages. Furthermore, this article emphasizes that the abolishment
legislation has ignored dead hand control in favor of providing wealthy settlors with an
estate planning tool to minimize federal transfer taxes. In conclusion, this article sug-
gests that in light of the consequences of dead hand control the abolishment legislation
should be stopped. Failure to stop the trend among jurisdictions could result in the
Federal government curtailing dead hand control.
II. Background
The Rule attempts to limit dead hand control by prohibiting the remote vesting
of contingent interests.22 Whether or not an interest violates the Rule depends on
whether or not vesting of a future interest occurs within the Rule's period.23 The ef-
fect of the Rule is that to the extent that the vesting occurs beyond the Rule's period
13. Lucas v. Harm, 56 Cal. 2d. 583, 364 P.2d 685, (1961). In that case a beneficiary brought a
malpractice action against an attorney who drafted a residual testamentary trust which violated the
Rule. The Supreme Court of California noted that an attorney who renders legal services agrees to use
such skill, prudence, and diligence as lawyers of ordinary skill. Due to the complexities of the Rule,
an attorney of ordinary skill could have misapplied the rule and therefore is not liable for malpractice.
14. See infra Part IV.A.
15. See infra Part IV.B.
16. See infra Part IV.C.
17. Eight jurisdictions have adopted walt and see; twenty-four jurisdictions have adopted USRAP;
seven jurisdictions have adopted cy pres.
18. Jurisdictions adhering to common law Rule include: Alabama, Arkansas, the District of Co-
lumbia, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Mississippi, Missouri, New Hampshire, New York, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington and Wyoming.
Dukeminier, Dynasty Trusts, supra note 10, at 419. Most of these jurisdictions have also adopted one
of the reform doctrines to alleviate the strict requirements of the Rule. Id.
19. The 1998 abolishment legislation includes Maryland and Illinois. See infra Part V.B.1.
20. Additional incentives such as asset protections and no requirement of fiduciary income tax
returns are offered in Alaska, Delaware and South Dakota. See infra Part V.B.2.
21. The forerunners at enacting the abolishment legislation include Wisconsin and Idaho. See infra
Part V.B.3.
22. JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRiER, PROPERTY 291 (4th ed. 1998) [hereinafter
DUKEMINIER, PROPERTY].
23. The Rule's period is the measuring life plus 21 years. See infra Part III.
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Rule Against Perpetuities
the interest is void. 4
The Rule had its origins in the seventeenth century and was the result of a com-
promise between wealthy landowners who desired to keep land within the family and
royal judges who tried to resist such efforts. 5 The wealthy landowner, in an attempt
to accomplish this objective, used many forms of land settlement involving future
interests to control his property after his death.26 Such "dead hand" control effectively
restricted the alienability of land and consequently the sociological and economic im-
pact was significant.'
The Duke of Norfolk's Case' was the first successful move by the royal judges
to limit the dead hand control.' In the Duke of Norfolk's Case the courts permitted
the settlor to control the disposition of property for a person's lifetime (the measuring
life),' provided the life existed at the time the interest was created." This was
viewed by courts to be a reasonable limitation on the settlor's control on property. The
settlor was permitted to exercise his judgment and control as to any then-living benefi-
ciaries and their abilities to handle the rights and responsibilities of property owner-
ship.32 Eventually the reasonable period of dead hand control was extended to account
for the unborn infant/beneficiary.33 Courts subsequently permitted the settlor to restrict
the alienability of land and exercise dead hand control and hinder marketability for a
time period as long as that of the measuring life plus twenty-one years.34
Although the Rule was set out in the Duke of Norfolk's Case, Professor Gray
was the first person to articulate the Rule with its widespread notoriety "no interest is
good unless it must vest, if at all, not later then twenty-one years after some life in
being at the creation of the interest.""
In summary, the Rule was the result of a compromise between the interests of
wealthy landowners and judges trying to prevent the dead from controlling the fu-
24. THoMAs F. BERGIN & PAUL G. HASKELL, PREFACE To ESTATES IN LAND AND FUTURE IN-
TEREsTs 179 (2d ed. 1984).
25. DUKEMINIER, PROPERTY, supra note 22, at 291.
26. BERGIN, supra note 24, at 179.
27. Id.
28. 3 Ch. Cas. 1, 22 Eng. Rep. 931 (1681).
29. The facts of this famous case, known for implementing the Rule arose when the wealth of
the Earl of Arundel was at risk of passing his estate to his eldest insane son. By law, the eldest son
was entitled to his father's wealth. Earl did not want his property to go to his insane son; instead he
wanted to control the property from his grave. Earl of Arundel enlisted the help of his lawyer to a
create trust o protect his family from his eldest son's actions. The Court acknowledged that Earl of
Arundel's concern was legitimate, and developed a reasonable period during which Earl's judgment
could prevail. According to the court, the father could realistically recognize the capabilities of living
members of his family, and so, with respect to them, the father's informed judgment solemnly in-
scribed in an instrument was given effect. The Earl was permitted to control only so long as his judg-
ment was informed with an understanding of the capabilities and needs of persons alive when the
judgment was made.
30. See infra Part III.
31. DUKEMINIER, PROPERTY, supra note 22, at 291.
32. Id.
33. After almost 150 years of applying the Rule, the courts fixed the period during which the set-
tlor could exercise dead hand control to the measuring life plus 21 years to account for a contingent
interest vesting in favor of a minor. Cadell v. Palmer, I Cl. & F. 372 (1833).
34. DUKEMINIER, PROPERTY, supra note 22, at 299.
35. See GRAY, supra note 1; see also BERGIN, supra note 24, at 178; DUKEMINIER, PROPERTY,
supra note 22, at 291.
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ture.' The compromise is that property may be tied up in contingent interests for
lives in being plus twenty-one years, but no longer."' In effect, a landowner could
"provide for all of those in his family whom he could have personally known and the
first generation thereafter attaining majority."'
IH. Basic Elements of the Rule
The Rule voids a contingent interest 9 that may not necessarily vest or fail with-
in a measuring life' plus twenty-one years (common law Rule period).4 ' The com-
mon law Rule permits a trust to endure for selected lives in being at the creation of the
trust' plus twenty-one years. 3 For example, a testator at death,4  may transfer
property into a trust for the benefit of his children for life and then to his grandchil-
dren who reach age twenty-one.' The trust will last for the lives of his children plus
twenty-one years. If the child was ten at the trust's creation4 and he or she lives to
seventy, the trust can endure for eighty-one years (sixty years for the life in being plus
an additional twenty-one years). This article will only address the contingent remain-
der' in a dynasty trust.' The Rule does not require that the trust terminate within
the Rule period, but does require that the contingent interests vest or fail within that
period. The abolishment legislation permits the trust to last forever and does not re-
quire the contingent interest to vest or fail to vest.49
In analyzing an interest under the Rule, one must first determine whether the
interest is subject to the Rule's application.' To determine if an interest violates the
36. See supra notes 28-29.
37. The wealthy decedent can control disposition of property for the lifetime of the person whose
propensities he or she may know or fear and for 21 years thereafter. It denies the wealthy decedent
the right to control disposition of property beyond 21 years after the death of the persons alive at cre-
ation.
38. 6 AM. L. OF PROP. § 24.16 (1952).
39. Contingent interests include contingent remainders and executory interests. Vested interests are
exempt. The possibility of reverter and right of entry are not included. See O'Brien, supra note 12.
This article only addresses the contingent remainders in a dynasty trust.
40. See infra Part III.
41. John K. Phoebus, The Rule Against Perpetuities-The Implication of a Reasonable Time for the
Performance of a Contingency to the Vesting of Future Interests in Commercial Transac-
tions-Maryland's Hybrid Approach to the Rule Against Perpetuities in Commercial Contexts, 101
DICK. L. REv. 619, 621 (1997).
42. See infra Part II.
43. GRAY, supra note 1.
44. The creation of the interests is at the death of the Testator.
45. The interest left to the grandchildren is a contingent remainder to which the Rule applies. The
interest is subject to a condition precedent that must occur prior to taking. The condition precedent is
the grandchild reaching age 21. Thus the Rule applies to this interest.
46. Because the transfer is by will, the creation is at the testator's death.
47. A contingent remainder is subject to a condition precedent or owned by unascertained persons.
BERGIN, supra note 24, at 73. Executory interests are also governed by the Rule but not addressed in
this article. See supra note 39.
48. A dynasty trust sometimes referred to as the perpetual or generation-skipping transfer trust is
generally a future interest trust intended to benefit multiple beneficiaries in multiple generations and
continue forever. Dukeminier, Dynasty Trusts, supra note 10.
49. For the above example, the abolishment legislation would permit the settlor to transfer prop-
erty into a trust for the lives of his children, grandchildren, great-grandchildren and future generations.
All interests could be conditioned on survivorship. There would be no requirement that a measuring
life or measuring lives be in existence at the creation of the interests.
50. Contingent remainders are always subject to the Rule. DUKEMINIER, PROPERTY, supra note 22,
at 266.
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Rule, an interest is judged prospectively from the time of the interest's creation, with-
out regard to events that occur after the interest's creation. According to W. Barton
Leach, a scholar, critic and whose writings5 ' initiated much of the American reform
of the Rule:
[A] future interest is invalid unless it is absolutely certain that it must vest within
the period of perpetuities. Probability of vesting, however great, is not sufficient.
Moreover, the certainty of vesting must have existed at the time when the instru-
ment took effect .... It is immaterial that the contingencies actually do occur
within the permissible period or actually have occurred when the validity of the
instrument is first litigated.
5 2
In order to determine if the interest will vest within the Rule period, a measuring
life must be identified. 3 One specific person, alive at the time of the creation of the
interest, need not be singled out and identified as the measuring life, provided the
interest vests within the life of one person, among a definable group of persons, plus
21 years. 4
If the will or trust is drafted with a contingent interest which violates the Rule,
the interest may not be void if the will or trust was drafted in a jurisdiction that recog-
nizes one of the various reform doctrines5 5 or included a savings clause.'
IV. Modern Reforms to the Rule
Since the Cadell v. Palmer57 case in 1833, the common law Rule has undergone
tremendous reform in England" as well as in America 9. 5 Reform was brought about
largely as a result of the absurd consequences of strict compliance with the Rule.' In
America, there have been many efforts and many doctrines adopted to reduce the
effects of the Rule and to remedy the violations thereof. Some of these reform doc-
trines include the "wait and see" doctrine, the Uniforms Statutory Rule Against Perpe-
tuities (USRAP) and cy pres.6
51. See infra note 71.
52. W. Barton Leach, Perpetuities in a Nutshell, 51 HARv. L. REV. 638 (1938) [hereinafter Leach,
Nutshell].
53. A contingent interest must vest within the life of, or at the death of the person, or within 21
years after the death of the person. That person is the measuring life. A measuring life can be a pre-
ceding life tenant, the taker or takers of the contingent interest, anyone who can affect the identity of
the takers, and anyone who can affect a condition precedent. DUKEMINIER, PROPERTY, supra note 22.
54. BERGIN, supra note 24, at 181; see also Fitchie v. Brown, 211 U.S. 321 (1908); Dickson v.
Renfro, 569 S.W.2d 66 (Ark. 1978); Wing v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., 241 S.E.2d 397 (N.C.
1978).
55. See infra Part IV.
56. A savings clause is a trust or will provision that provides for the termination or distribution
in the event of a Rule violation. See Dukeminier, Dynasty Trusts, supra note 10, at 3-4.
57. Cadell, 1 Cl. & F. 372.
58. The Perpetuities & Accumulations Act, 1964, ch. 55. For a more detailed discussion of the
reform doctrines adopted in England, see W. Barton Leach, Perpetuities Reform by Legislation: Eng-
land, 70 HARV. L. REV. 1411 (1957) [hereinafter Leach, Perpetuities Reform]; Robert J. Lynn, Perpe-
tuities Reform: An Analysis of Developments in England and the United States, 113 U. PA. L. REv.
508 (1965).
59. See infra Part IV.A-C.
60. See W. Barton Leach, Perpetuities Legislation: Hail Pennsylvania!, 108 U. PA. L. REV. 1124
(1960) [hereinafter Leach, Hail Pennsylvania]. See infra note 66.
61. For a brief description of the reform doctrines, see infra Part IV.A-C.
1999]
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Professor Leach, a leading authority in the field and instrumental in the legisla-
tive reform doctrines, once referred to the Rule as a "technically-ridden nightmare".62
The Rule's application and harsh consequences63 led many scholars and lawyers to
call for reform doctrines.' The reform doctrines have alleviated the strict require-
ments of the historical Rule.' Modem efforts to reform the Rule were widely accept-
ed and welcomed in an effort to reduce the absurd consequences of the Rule.67
A. "Wait and See"
Jurisdictions that have not eliminated the effect of the Rule have either enacted
legislation' or by judicial decision' adopted the "wait and see" doctrine, which
takes a bite out of the Rule.7" Professor Leach's position which brought about the
"wait and see" reform doctrine is based on the premise that the vesting of contingent
interests should reflect actual events as opposed to mere possibilities.7 Under this
doctrine interests are judged, based on actual events as opposed to prospectively exam-
ining the interest. Jurisdictions that follow this approach" will not void an interest
for violating the Rule unless an actual event or the actual nonoccurrence of an event
prevents an interest from vesting or failing within the Rule's period.
In 1947, Pennsylvania became the first jurisdiction to adopt the broad "wait and
see" doctrine now adopted in eight states.74 One jurisdiction" has adopted a more
limited form of the "wait and see" approach. That jurisdiction waits only until the
expiration of the life estates possessed by individuals who were lives in being at the
62. W. Barton Leach, Perpetuities Legislation Massachusetts Style, 67 HARV. L. REV. 1349 (1954)
[hereinafter Leach, Massachusetts Style].
63. See Dickerson v. Union, 595 S.W.2d 677 (Ark. 1980). This case is know as the "unborn wid-
ow case". In Dickerson, the Testatrix created a trust to continue "until the death of both sons and one
son, Martin's widow and until the youngest of either son has reached the age of twenty-five years."
The court held the trust violated the rule since the son's "widow" might not be born at the Testatrix's
death.
64. W. Barton Leach, Perpetuities in Perspective: Ending the Rules' Reign of Terror, 65 HARV.
L. REV. 721,739-41 (1952) [hereinafter Leach, Perpetuities in Perspective].
65. The reform relief is primarily from not mandating that the interest be judged prospectively
based on a mere possibility that the interest could fail.
66. See Jee v. Audley 29 End. Rep 1186 (1787). In Jee, a contingent interest violated the Rule
because of the absurd possibility that a 70-year old woman might bear children. This case gained wide
notoriety as the fertile octogenarian situation, that a person is always presumed to be able to have
children regardless of age or physical condition. DUKEMINIER, PROPERTY, supra note 22, at 311.
67. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY.
68. See infra note 74.
69. New Hampshire adopted wait and see by judicial decision. Merchants National Bank v. Curtis,
97 A.2d 207 (N.H. 1953).
70. DUKEMINIER, PROPERTY, supra note 22, at 312.
71. Leach, Nutshell, supra note 52; Leach, Hail Pennsylvania, supra note 60; Leach, Massachu-
setts Style, supra note 62; Leach, Perpetuities in Perspective, supra note 64; W. Barton Leach, The
Rule Against Perpetuities and Gifts to Classes, 51 HARV. L. REV. 1329 (1938); W. Barton Leach,
Powers of Sale in Trustees and The Rule Against Perpetuities, 47 HARV. L. REV. 948 (1934).
72. Phoebus, supra note 41.
73. Infra notes 74-75.
74. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 301.4-5 (1950). The other seven states are: Iowa, Kentucky, Ohio,
Rhode Island, Vermont, Virginia, and Washington. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 558.68 (West 1992); KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 381.216 (Michie 1972 & Supp. 1996); OHiO REV. CODE ANN. § 2131.08c (West
1998); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-11-38 (1995); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 501 (1998); VA. CODE ANN. §
55-13.3 (Michie 1995); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 11.98.130, 11.98.900 (1998).
75. Maine is the only jurisdiction using this approach. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 101 (West
1998). Prior to the abolishment legislation Maryland also was a limited wait and see jurisdiction.
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time the interest was created to determine if the contingent interest will vest or fail
within twenty-one years of that time.'
B. Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities
In addition to the above-mentioned variations of the "wait and see" doctrine, a
majority of the jurisdictions have adopted the USRAP.' USRAP validates interests
that comply with the common law Rule. In the event that the interest does not comply
with the common law Rule all interests will be valid if they actually vest within a 90-
year "wait and see" period. If the interests do not actually vest within 90 years, a court
will reform the trust to comply with the settlor's intent.78
Therefore, the common law justification of permitting settlors to control only
property during the lives of persons who they know and whose ability they can judge
plus 21 years thereafter was virtually eliminated by jurisdictions adopting the
USRAP. 79 USRAP allows the drafter to specify which period (common law Rule peri-
od or 90-year "wait and see" period) governs trust termination. The settlor can not
select the longer Rule period based on actual events.'
C. Cy Pres
Reform is also permitted under the cy pres doctrine."' The cy pres doctrine al-
76. Id.
77. Currently 24 jurisdictions have adopted USRAP including: Alaska, Arizona, California, Colora-
do, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Indiana, Kansas, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mon-
tana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon, South Caro-
lina, Tennessee and West Virginia. See ALASKA STAT. §§ 34.27.050-34.27.090 (Michie 1998) ; ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 14-2901-14-2906 (West Supp. 1997); CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 21200-21231 (West
Supp. 1994); COLO REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 15-11-1101 to 15-11-1107 (West 1997); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 45a-490 to 45a-496 (West 1993); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 689.225 (West 1994); GA. CODE ANN.
§§ 44-6-200 to 44-6-206 (1998); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 525-1 to 525-6 (Michie 1993); IND.
CODE ANN. §§ 32-1-4.5-1 to 32-1-4.5-6 (Michie 1995); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-3401 to 59-3408
(1994); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 184A § 1-11 (West 1991); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 554.71-
554.78 (West Supp. 1998); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 501A.01-501A.07 (West 1990); MONT. CODE ANN.
§§ 72-2-1001 to 72-2-1007 (1997); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 76-2001 to 76-2008 (Michie 1995); NEV.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 111.103-111.1039 (Michie 1998); NJ. STAT. ANN. §§ 46:2F-1-46:2F-8 (West
Supp. 1997) ; N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-2-901 to 45-2-906 (Michie 1998); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 41-15
to 41-22 (1998); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 47-02-27.1 to 47-02-27.5 (1997); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 105.950-
105.975 (1995); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 27-6-10 to 27-6-80 (Law Co-op. 1991); TENN. CODE ANN. §§
66-1-201 to 66-1-208 (1999); W. VA. CODE §§ 36-lA-1 to 361A-8 (1997).
78. Perpetuities Table of Jurisdictions, Uniform Law Annotated, Master Edition 8B U.L.A. 41
(Supp. 1996).
79. USRAP abandons the idea of the Rule period being tied to a measuring life in existence at
the time of the creation. Defining the Rule period in this way was based on the policy that it was
reasonable to allow donors to control property during the lives of persons they could have known and
whose abilities they could judge. DUKEMINIER, PROPERTY, supra note 22, at 314. However, some
scholars believe that the 90-year wait and see period is justified because it was less confusing than
identifying a measuring life. See Mary L. Fellows, Testing Perpetuity Reform: A Study of Perpetuity
Cases 1984-89, 25 REAL PROP PROB. & T. J. 597 (1991). The adoption of the USRAP reform by
jurisdictions has abandoned the initial basis of the Rule period being tied to a measuring life plus 21
years. The policy arguments against USRAP reform is beyond the scope of this article.
80. However, a special power of appointment can be given to a donee to subsequently change the
perpetuity period.
81. Idaho, Iowa, Kentucky, Missouri, Ohio, Rhode Island Vermont have adopted a Cy pres statute.
See IDAHO CODE § 55-111 (1994); IOWA CODE ANN. § 558.68 (West 1992); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §
381.216 (Michie 1972 & Supp. 1996); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 442.555 (West 1986); OHIo REV. CODE
ANN. § 2131.08 (Anderson 1998); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 18-4-1 (1996); VT. STAT. ANN. tit 14 § 2328
(1998); BERGIN, supra note 24, at 178-80; Phoebus, supra note 41.
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lows courts to reform interests so that they will not violate the Rule. 2 A broad ver-
sion of this doctrine permits equitable reformation to modify any transaction that
would violate the Rule. 3 A more limited version of cy pres applies only to invalid
age contingencies, allowing courts to reduce the age contingency to 21 years, thus sav-
ing the interests."4
The existence of the reform doctrines minimizes the harsh results of violations of
the Rule. The common law Rule reform was intended to "disturb the common law rule
as little as possible."85 Despite the overwhelming existence-of reform, jurisdictions are
abolishing the Rule to minimize transfer taxes for wealth settlors and generate income
for the banking industry.
V. Abolishment of the Rule
A. Overview of Abolishment Legislation
Most recently, legislators have been taking an aggressive stand towards abolish-
ing the Rule for interests in trusts with private beneficiaries (hereinafter abolishment
legislation). The abolishment legislation permits a settlor to create a dynasty trust.8
The legislation has been enacted to provide a wealthy settlor with another vehicle by
which he or she can minimize transfer taxes and to provide the state with a "carrot" to
attract trust business to its state and allow the banking industry to profit.' A settlor is
free to create an inter vivos trust in any jurisdiction that he or she chooses." There-
fore, the abolishment legislation creates an incentive for a non-resident settlor to create
an inter vivos trust in a jurisdiction that has enacted said legislation. Creating an inter
vivos trust in an abolishment legislation jurisdiction will allow trust assets to be admin-
istered in that jurisdiction and trust companies will generate income therefrom. Further-
more, the legislation may generate additional revenue by way of income tax."
There are three categories of abolishment legislation. The 1998-abolishment
legislation, which includes Maryland" and Illinois." These jurisdictions have similar
requirements and became effective in 1998. The additional-incentive jurisdictions are
82. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 101 (West 1998).
83. California adopted full-scale cy pres in 1963. CAL Civ. CODE § 715.5 (West Supp. 1964).
84. Id.
85. Commissioner report on subsection 9(b) reprinted in 20 PA. CONST. STAT. ANN. § 6104
(1998); Phoebus, supra note 41. But see supra note 79.
86. See supra note 48 for definition of dynasty trust.
87. See fiscal analysis of Maryland Bill which states "'due to the rule against perpetuities, all
trusts in Maryland generally must terminate between 80 to 110 years after creation. Several others
states have modified the rule against perpetuities in order to permit the creation of the perpetual dy-
nasty trust. Therefore, a Maryland resident can currently create a perpetual dynasty trust, but only if
the trust is located in a state that modified the rule against perpetuities in this regard (i.e., if the trust
is administered by a banking institution located in one of those states). As a result of the [abolishment
legislation] bill, Maryland banks could administer perpetual dynasty trusts." H.B. 495 (Md. 1998).
88. Trust law is a creature of state law. Wilmington Trust Co. v. Wilmington Trust Co. 24 A.2d
309, 313 (Del. 1942). The jurisdiction of domicile controls testamentary trusts whereas a settlor may
forum shop for a desirable jurisdiction for his or her inter vivos trust.
89. Maryland's fiscal analysis indicates that state income tax revenues could increase to the extent
that Maryland banks receive additional income in the form of trust administration fees. See Md. H.
Res. 495; see infra Part V.B.2.
90. Testamentary or inter vivos trusts created on or after October 1, 1998 are governed by the
Maryland abolishment legislation. See supra note 2.
91. Testamentary or inter vivos trusts created on or after January 1, 1998 are governed by the Il-
linois abolishment legislation. See supra note 3.
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Alaska,' Delaware,93 and South Dakota." These jurisdictions do not impose an in-
come tax on the income generated by the fiduciary of the dynasty trust and protect
trust assets from the settlor's creditors. The third category groups the forerunners of
the abolishment legislation, Wisconsin" and Idaho." The forerunner jurisdictions
pre-dated the other abolishment legislation by more than a decade and were enacted
for different reasons. The following discussion does not discuss the individual legisla-
tion, but discusses the legislation as categorized.
B. The Abolishment Legislation
1. The 1998-abolishment legislation
Maryland' and Illinois" were the most recent jurisdictions to enact abolish-
ment legislation. These jurisdictions allow estate planners to draft trust documents with
contingent interests that avoid the Rule." The 1998-abolishment legislation requires
that the trust document express the settlor's intent to avoid the Rule"ru and the trustee
is given the power to "sell, lease or mortgage property for any period beyond the peri-
od of the rule against perpetuities',"'
The 1998-abolishment legislation was enacted to encourage and/or keep trust
business within the state's boundaries and appears to be a direct response to other
legislation previously enacted."r Maryland and Illinois wanted to discourage its resi-
dents from taking trust business to neighboring jurisdictions 3 where dynasty trusts
were permitted.'" The advantages gained from allowing a settlor to create a dynasty
trust are that wealthy settlors can minimize transfer taxes," trustees will generate
92. ALASKA STAT. § 34.27.050(a)(3) (Michie 1998).
93. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 503(a) (Supp. 1998).
94. S.D. CODIitED LAWS § 51A-6A (Michie 1997).
95. Wisc. STAT. ANN. § 700.16 (West 1997 & Supp. 1998).
96. IDAHO CODE § 55-111 (1994).
97. See supra note 2 for trusts executed or amended on or after October 1, 1998.
98. See supra note 3. Effective August 17, 1997 for trusts created on or after January 1, 1998.
99. The Rule is avoided by expressing an intent to avoid the Rule and including amongst the
trust terms the trustee's ability to buy and sell trust assets.
100. Under Maryland law, the governing instrument must state that the Rule Against Perpetuities
does not apply to the trust. MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTs § 11-102(e) (Supp. 1998). The Illinois
statute uses the term "qualified perpetual trust" which requires specific trust terms to dictate that the
rule against perpetuities does not apply. 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 305/3(a-5)(i) (West 1993 & Supp.
1998).
101. Id. § 11-102(e); 765 ILL. CoMw. STAT. § 305/3(a-5)(i)-(ii).
102. Five jurisdictions had enacted the abolishment legislation at the time the 1998-abolishment leg-
islation was being considered. Those jurisdictions include Illinois, Alaska, Delaware, South Dakota,
Wisconsin and Idaho. Furthermore, Maryland's fiscal analysis states that a Maryland resident could cre-
ate a dynasty trust in other jurisdictions. See Md. H. Res. 495.
103. Delaware and Wisconsin had previously enacted abolishment legislation at the time the Mary-
land and Illinois enacted the 1998-abolishment legislation. It is obvious that the 1998-abolishment legis-
lation was enacted due to the potential threat of loosing trust business to these neighboring states.
104. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 503 (Supp. 1998); WiS. STAT. ANN. § 700.16 (West 1997 &
Supp. 1998).
105. Wealthy settlors minimize transfer taxes by placing assets in trust and providing the further
generations of beneficiaries with only a life estate which is not subject to an additional transfer tax at
the beneficiaries' subsequent death. I.R.C. § 2036 (1998). However, to the extent the trust assets are
available for a generation more than one generation removed from the settlor (skip generations) the
transfer in trust may be subject to a generation skipping transfer tax. See infra Part V.C.3.
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additional revenue, and additional income tax will be generated for the state.'06 Law-
makers justified the legislation, without any reference to or limitation on dead hand
control. The 1998-abolishment legislation implied that the generation-skipping transfer
tax imposes sufficient controls on the wealthy dead hand.'"
It is not surprising that the bankers' association heavily supported the abolish-
ment legislation." The 1998-abolishment legislation virtually had no opposition.'"
There was no support for retaining the Rule and its reform doctrines for contingent
interests in trusts with private beneficiaries. Consequently, dead hand control returns
for such interests. Thus, the Rule, which originated as a reasonable limitation on dead
hand control, no longer reflects this historical compromise." ' It is apparent that
wealth has prevailed. The wealthy settlor who desires to exercise dead hand control
may do so by testamentary or inter vivos trust.'
In sum, the 1998-abolishment legislation has identical requirements: (1) that the
settlor's intent to avoid the Rule be clear from the trust terms and (2) that the trustee
have the ability to sell trust assets."'2 The drafter can create dynasty trusts, allowing
the trusts to remain in existence forever, thus dead hand control returns. The legislation
was motivated by jurisdictions competing for trust business. Additionally, wealthy
settlors minimize transfer taxes,"' and additional income is generated,"4 as a result
of settlors creating trusts in these jurisdictions and corporate trustees,"5 primarily the
trust banking companies, ' earning additional trust commissions and paying addi-
tional income taxes.
106. See supra note 89.
107. Maryland's fiscal analysis further demonstrated a wealthy settlor's ability to minimize estate
taxes by noting that the dynasty trust would be especially suited for transfers within the settlor's one-
million dollar generation skipping transfer tax exemption. The analysis stated that transfers within the
settlor's one-million dollar exemption received favorable transfer tax advantages, implying that settlors
would not likely make transfers in excess of the generation-skipping transfer tax exemption, thus the
one-million dollar exemption was a sufficient limitation on dead hand control. See Md. H. Res. 495;
see infra Part V.C.3.
108. In Maryland the Maryland Bankers' Association testified on behalf of the legislation and was
listed as the Information Source. See Md. H. Res. 495.
109. No one-from the academic community was contacted regarding the Maryland 1998-abolishment
legislation. There was no testimony in favor of retaining the Rule and its current reform, which then
permitted property to be held in trust for 80 to 110 years after its creation. See supra note 87.
110. See supra Part II.
111. If the individual is domiciled in an abolishment legislation jurisdiction using a testamentary or
inter vivos trust or if the settlor is not domiciled in an abolishment legislation jurisdiction by forum
shopping and creating an inter vivos trust.
112. MD. CODE ANN., EsT. & TRusTs § 11-102(e) (Supp. 1998); 765 ILL. CoMI. STAT. § 305/3(a-
5)(i)-(ii) (West 1993 & Supp. 1998).
113. See infra Part V.D.I.
114. The 1998-abolishment legislation is expected to result in "a minimal increase in general funds
revenue" as a result of the increased corporate income tax generated by trust companies from the
additional trustee commissions earned from administering the dynasty trusts. See Md. H. Res. 495.
115. A settlor may select a corporate or individual trustee. A corporate trustee is the better candi-
date for the position because of the continuity in management that can be provided. A dynasty trust
will last several generations and an entity is the only trustee, which endure forever like the perpetual
trust.
116. With the creation of a perpetual trust designed to last forever, it is likely that corporate trust-
ees will be selected. The indefinite duration of corporate trustees encourages its selection over an indi-
vidual trustee with successor trustees named. The problem with naming individual trustees and succes-
sor trustees is that the settlor can not name unborn individuals.
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2. Additional incentives are available in Alaska, Delaware and South Dakota
Like the 1998-abolishment legislation, the abolishment legislation in these addi-
tional-incentive jurisdictions permits dead hand control. These states do not impose a
fiduciary income tax on the trust income" 7  and/or offer the settlor asset
protection.' Asset protection allows trust assets to be insulated from the settlor's
creditors and unforeseen circumstances of future generations.
a. Alaska
In 1997 Alaska amended its statute' 19 to validate an interest in a trust if all or
part of the income or principal of the trust may be distributed under the discretion of
the trustee to a life in being at the creation of the interest. 2 If the named trustee is
given the power to make discretionary distributions of principal or income to a benefi-
ciary living at the creation, the property interest created in the trust will be valid even
if that interest remains contingent for generations.
Unique to the Alaska abolishment legislation is the requirement that a discretion-
ary trust be established in which the trustee has the ability to distribute to a life in
being at the trust's creation.' There is no other requirement imposed on the settlor.
The trustee is not required to exercise said discretion favorably to beneficiaries. Absent
abuse of discretion, the trustee can not be forced to exercise discretion in favor of
distributing to a life in being.' 2
b. Delaware
In 1995 Delaware amended its statute to include personal property.' In Dela-
ware, wealthy landowners were always at liberty to exercise dead hand control. Dela-
ware amended its abolishment legislation for personal property held in a trust as to
documents created on or after July 7, 1995.124 It was clear that Delaware amended its
abolishment legislation, in an effort to keep its trust business competitive.' z
The 1995 amendment to include personal property along with land was brought
about at a time in which the traditional notion of land equaling wealth was not neces-
sarily the case.'26 After the drastic decline in the real estate market across the nation
117. In South Dakota there is no state income tax. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 43-5-8 (Michie 1997).
This is advantageous for the non-resident settlor or non-resident beneficiary if income tax can be
avoided in his domicliary state. See Pierce H. McDowell, The Dynasty Trust: Protective Armor for
Generations to Come: Special Use Trusts, 132 Ti. & EST. 47-54 (1993). Delaware for example, does
not have a state fiduciary or capital gains tax on trust accumulations for non-resident beneficiaries.
118. ALASKA STAT. §§ 13.12.205(2)(A), 13.36.035(a),(c), 13.36.045(a)(2), 13.36.310, 13.36.390,
34.27.050(a)(3), 34.40.010 (Michie 1998) (amending the Alaskan trust law to protect settlor's assets
from creditors. See also Joel C. Dobris, Changes in the Role and the Form of the Trust at the New
Millennium, or, We Don't Have to Think of England Anymore, 62 ALB. L. REV. 543, 578 n.60 (1998).
119. Alaska previously recognized USRAP reform.
120. ALASKA STAT. § 34.27.050(a)(3) (Michie 1998).
121. Id.
122. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 187 (1959).
123. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 503(a) (Supp. 1998).
124. Id.
125. Id.; Dukeminier, Dynasty Trusts, supra note 10, at 422-23.
126. Wealth today has changed from real property to personal property that is readily liquid such
as stocks, bonds, mutual funds and interest-bearing bank accounts. See O'Brien, supra note 12, at 383
n.2.
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suffered in the early 1990's, Delaware was quick to act in amending its legislation to
provide the once wealthy landowner with the ability to exercise dead hand control over
personal property.' The Delaware abolishment legislation was direct in addressing
its reason for abolishing the Rule for personal property. The amendment to the Dela-
ware Code states the abolishment legislation was enacted to "[k]eep Delaware competi-
tive in the formations of trust capital."'" The purpose of the abolishment legislation
amendment was expressly to attract trust business to its state.
Delaware's abolishment legislation amendment was clearly made from an eco-
nomic perspective. The return to dead hand control did not disturb the legislators of
Delaware as is obvious from its decision to never adopt the Rule for real property.
Delaware was quick to amend its legislation to provide for the change in investments
brought about after the decline in the real estate market.
In addition to the dynasty trust, Delaware offers its citizens and non-residents
added features not shared with all abolishment legislation jurisdictions. Delaware has
no state fiduciary income tax filing requirement and asset protection.'" In addition to
dead hand control, income tax savings feature and asset protections are added incen-
tives to creating a Delaware dynasty trust.
c. South Dakota
South Dakota is an added-incentive jurisdiction and offers the features previously
mentioned for Alaska and Delaware. However, South Dakota was more than a decade
ahead of the other additional-incentive jurisdictions. As early as 1983,"3 the purpose
of South Dakota legislation was to attract trust business to the state.' 3' Furthermore,
the South Dakota statute permits the formation of a private trust company in its ju-
risdiction.'32 There is a $200,000 capital requirement and a $5,000 application fee, in
order to sign on board.'33
3. The forerunners of abolishment legislation were Wisconsin and Idaho
a. Wisconsin
In 1976, Wisconsin enacted abolishment legislation."' Wisconsin enacted a
statute that put it quite clearly. "[Tihe common law rule against perpetuities is not in
force in this state."'35 The Wisconsin statute provides that "[t]here is no suspension
of the power of alienation by a trust or by equitable interests under a trust if the trust-
ee has power to sell, either expressed or implied, or if there is an unlimited power to
127. In 1995, land had not been appreciating like it once was and even depreciating in some cas-
es, the stock market was healthy, interest rates were declining and investments in personal property for
investors were more attractive than the traditional land investment.
128. Tit. 25, § 503(a); Dukeminier, Dynasty Trusts, supra note 10, at 422-23.
129. Tit. 25, § 503(a); John E. Sullivan, Gutting Rule Against Self-Settled Trusts: How The New
Delaware Trust Law Computes With Offshore Trusts, 23 DEL J. CORP. L. 423 (1998). Asset protection
insulates the trust assets from the settlor's creditors.
130. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 51A-6A (Michie 1998).
131. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 43-5-8 (Michie 1997).
132. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 51A-6A (Michie 1998).
133. Id. §§ 51A-6A-19, 51A-6A-6; Thomas H. Foye, Using South Dakota Law for Perpetual
Trusts, PROB. & PROP. (1998).
134. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 700.16(5) (West 1997 & Supp. 1998).
135. Id.
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terminate in one or more persons in being."'"
The Wisconsin statute does impose statutory requirements that the trustee have
the power to sell or an unlimited power to terminate in order for the trust instrument to
avoid the harsh consequences of the Rule.
b. Idaho
The abolishment legislation started in Idaho, a state primarily of land wealth, in
response to a 1949 case from the Idaho Supreme Court, which abolished the Rule."
Idaho adopted what is intended to be a complete system governing alienation of real
property'" and the common law rule against perpetuities was not in force in that ju-
risdiction. '39 Idaho has no suspension rule for personal property."4 Idaho's abolish-
ment legislation states that there shall be no rule against perpetuities applicable to real
or personal property. Idaho did not limit its abolition legislation to real property but in-
stead enacted broad legislation, which included both real and personal property. Addi-
tionally, the Idaho statute, similar to several of the subsequently enacted abolishment
statutes, required that the trustee have discretion or the power to sell the trust property
to avoid any suspension problems. 4'
The Idaho abolishment legislation, like many of the jurisdictions that eventually
followed, failed to statutorily provide the beneficiaries with a means by which prema-
ture trust termination could be handled. 42 Furthermore, permitting the dead hand to
control property in the future based on facts unknown to the settlor at the time of
creation of the trust could have devastating effects for the beneficiaries and his or her
heirs. Idaho's reasoning behind taking the initial step towards abolishment legislation
was not to attract trust business to the state of Idaho in 1949 and thereafter. Instead the
legislative intent was to deal with the overriding concerns that legislators had in pre-
serving the settlor's intent.' 3 At that time, the policy concerns favoring the reflection
of the settlor's intent outweighed the policy justifications behind the common law
Rule."
136. Id. § 700.16(3).
137. Locklear v. Tucker, 203 P.2d 380 (Idaho .1949).
138. IDAHO CODE § 55-111 (1994).
139. Locklear, 203 P.2d at 380.
140. IDAHO CODE § 55-111 (1994).
141. Id.
142. For example, suppose the settlor, a farmland owner in Idaho, transfers farmland into a trust in
which the trustee was given the ability to sell assets. There was no mandatory requirement imposed on
the trustee with respect to the distribution of income or principal. At the creation, it was the settlor's
intent to keep the farmland within the family forever. At some future time, well after the settlor's
death, the expenses of administering the trust far exceeded the income. Small tracts of the property
will be sold at discounted values to pay trust expenses. The trustee has no power to terminate. There-
fore small tracts of the farm will be sold off indefinitely until all trust assets are gone. Furthermore,
trust beneficiaries do not have liquidity to purchase the tracts because the dead as opposed to the
living is controlling wealth and deceased settlors did not adequately provide for unforeseen circum-
stances. The problems that arise with permitting this dead hand control is that even though the trustee
has the power to sell, he may not exercise his or her discretion to do so. Small tracts of farmland
could eventually be disposed of in a fashion that clearly was not in the best interest of the beneficia-
ries.
143. Various aspects of trust law, such as the enforcement of a spendthrift trust that thrives on
giving great weight to honoring the settlor's intent. Broadway National Bank v. Adams, 133 Mass. 170
(1882).
144. Id.
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C. The Argument Against Abolishment Legislation
Although a persuasive argument could be made for the abolishment legisla-
tion, " the abolishment legislation ignores the policy argument that property rights
belong to the living not the dead. The abolishment legislation allows wealthy settlors
to create a dynasty trust and control property for many generations after their death.
The Rule's compromise was inspired to prevent inalienability of property and dead
hand control. 4 The trustee's ability to sell trust assets resolves the concern of in-
alienability. 47 However, dead hand control is a valid concern and should not be over-
looked.
Dead hand control caused by the abolishment: (1) hinders the marketability of
property;' 4 (2) perpetuates the concentration of wealth;'49 (3) is discouraged only
by the generation-skipping transfer tax; ° and (4) fails to provide the beneficiaries
with a means for terminating the dynasty trust based on unforeseen circumstances.'5
Problems such as trust assets being unavailable for social needs, debtor-creditor issues,
beneficiary resentment, and uninformed forum shopping are also consequences of the
settlor exercising unrestricted dead hand control.
1. Marketability
Excessive restraints on property ownership destroy the property's marketabili-
ty.5 2 Dead hand control frustrates the ability of current equitable owners and pro-
spective purchasers to engage in a transaction that could make them both better off.
Dynasty trusts may result in inefficient use of resources because of unforeseen con-
tingencies that disadvantage the beneficiaries and community as a whole. 3 Further-
more, when property is held in a dynasty trust, the persons in possession of the proper-
ty lose the ability to make decisions based on individual preferences regarding property
ownership.'
On its face, the abolishment legislation appears to alleviate the lack of market-
ability caused by dead hand control by requiring that the trustee have the ability to sell
trust assets or have the discretion to terminate.'5 However, the ability to sell trust
145. Dukeminier, supra note 10. According to Dukeminier, in his article addressed to estate plan-
ners, the Rule is no longer essential to fulfil the functions of ensuring that property is freely alienable
and curtailing dead hand control. Dukeminier further states the usefulness or lack thereof, of the Rule
when compared to the complexities and uncertainties and time invested in learning and remembering
the Rule and or reform doctrines perhaps makes the abolishment legislation makes a sensible solution.
146. See supra Part II-III.
147. ALAsKA STAT. § 34.27.050(a)(3) (Michie 1998); IDAHO CODE § 55-111 (1994); 765 ILL.
Comp. STAT. 305/2-6 (West 1993 & Supp. 1998); MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRuSTS § 11-102(e)
(Supp. 1998); WiS. STAT. ANN. § 700.16 (West 1997 & Supp. 1998).
148. See infra Part V.C.I.
149. See infra Part V.C.2.
150. See infra Part V.C.3.
151. See infra Part V.C.4.
152. DUKEMtNIER, PROPERTY, supra note 22, at 283.
153. See, McDowell, supra note 117, at 47 (mentioning editors now requiring sale of Boston Globe
was prompted by expiration of family trusts).
154. It is also expected that the dynasty trust will be funded with "keep sake" assets like farmland
or ranch interests in a closely held business. Beneficiaries' preferences to retain these assets may be
outweighed by trustees making decisions solely from an economic perspective. See SC 28 ALI-ABA
379 H(l)(b)(d).
155. The 1998-abolishment legislation requires that the settlor's intent be expressed and that the
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assets or the discretion to terminate does not mandate the trustee do so, even if the
failure to do so is not beneficial for the trust beneficiaries. Dynasty trusts will likely
provide the trustee with broad discretion to accommodate various changes in the tax
laws. This discretion permits the trustee to make decisions based on changed or un-
foreseen circumstances not present or known to the settlor at the creation of the
trust." The broad discretion is like a double-edged sword, in that the trustee has the
ability to liquidate trust assets or terminate the trust, but no guarantee that the trustee
will exercise said discretion. Providing the trustee with broad discretion, absent an
abuse of discretion,57 beneficiaries will be unable to force the trustee to sell or retain
trust assets even if it is in everyone's best interest.
The abolishment legislation favors wealthy settlors' intent to exercise unlimited
dead hand control. As a result, assets are tied up in trust arrangements potentially
forever and the marketability of the trust assets is hindered which damages not only
the beneficiaries but also the community at large. Additionally, the abolishment
legislation's mandatory requirement that the trustee have the ability to sell assets does
nothing to guarantee marketability. Dynasty trusts will be drafted with broad discre-
tionary powers, to account for changed or unforeseen changes in the law, and such
discretion will protect the trustee from being liable for his action regarding the sale or
onsale of trust assests. Despite the fact that the abolishment legislation attempts to
alleviate the marketability concerns of dead hand control, the abolishment legislation
provides no grounds for enforcement by trust beneficiaries.
Wealthy members of one generation control disposition. Even if the trustee has
the ability to sell assets, proceeds remain controlled by the trust provisions forever.
The wealthy members of one generation should not be permitted to ignore preferences
of future generations regarding the use and disposition of property.
2. Perpetuates the concentration of wealth
Additionally, the abolishment legislation perpetuates the concentration of
wealth. 5 Abolishment legislation protects the rich from liquidating their property
holdings and distributing cash through spending.'59 If rich beneficiaries cannot make
trustee have the ability to sell trust assets. MD. CODE ANN., Esr. & TRUSTS § 11-102(e) (Supp.
1998); 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. 305/3(a-5)(i)-(ii) (West 1993 & Supp. 1998). In Alaska the only require-
ment is that a discretionary trust be established giving the trustee the ability to terminate in favor of a
measuring life. ALASKA STAT. § 34.27.050(a)(3) (Michie 1998). Delaware imposes no required trust
provision and abolishes the Rule for personality in response to the change in the definition of wealth.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 503(a) (Supp. 1998). South Dakota and Wisconsin provide the settlor with
the option of giving the trustee the ability to sell or discretion to terminate. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
§ 43-5-8 (Michie 1997); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 700.16 (West 1997 & Supp. 1998). Idaho, like the 1998
abolishment legislation, requires that the trustee have the ability to sell trust assets. IDAHO CODE § 55-
111 (1994).
156. Furthermore because of the nature of the trust, over time the individual trustee, either acting
on behalf of a corporate trustee or in his or her individual capacity, is likely to change and be far re-
moved from knowing who the settlor was and what the settlor would have wanted. In light of this
anticipated distance between the trustee and settlor, the trustee should be expected to make discretion-
ary decisions from an economic perspective without taking into consideration the settlor's subjective
intent.
157. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 187 (1959). An example of abuse of discretion includes
the trustee refusing to terminate to preserve his, her or its trust commission.
158. Phoebus, supra note 41.
159. See G. Graham Waite, Let's Abolish The Rule Against Perpetuities, 21 REAL EST. L.J. 93
(1993), in which a survey of 48 attorneys reflected that a person should be allowed to make money
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decisions to sell the property then the beneficiaries cannot liquidate their interest and
spread wealth around by consuming. The perpetuation of the power and control held
by the settlor keeps wealth from being acquired and/or distributed to others.
For example, Bill Gates could create a dynasty trust and concentrate his wealth
of $97,541,600,000 (hereinafter the Gates' wealth)."6 If the Gates' wealth is retained
in a dynasty trust, assets reinvested at an annual 8% rate of return and not spread
around by beneficiary consumption, after 100 years his accumulation would mount to
$214,568,232,600.6 ' This represents the potential impact that one wealthy individual
could have by perpetuating his wealth. The additional accumulation and concentration
of wealth by others promotes the rich getting richer and the poor getting poorer. Fur-
thermore, the concentration of wealth may make it impossible for those born outside
the umbrella of inherited wealth to break into that chain of wealth."
The concentration of wealth is not healthy for Americans and could lead to un-
equal treatment based on wealth."6 3 It is essential to a healthy economic society that
the wealth accumulation of one generation be placed back into society by the next
generation in the way of spending as opposed to continued wealth accumulation.'
The abolishment legislation provides an attractive avenue for wealthy individuals to
continue accumulation of wealth Without the needed spending. The continued accumu-
lation of wealth discourages socialism between the wealthy and others which could
ultimately lead to Americans being further separated, further discrimination based on
wealth and other sociological and economic consequences.
3. The generation-skipping transfer tax imposes a nominal limitation on dead
hand control
If dead hand control is promoted and encouraged by abolishment legislation, the
only limitation will be the generation-skipping transfer tax (hereinafter sometimes
referred to as the GSTT penalty). However, for the extremely wealthy, this may be an
insufficient limitation in light of the overall transfer tax advantages to be gained by the
abolishment legislation.
The federal estate and gift tax is a transfer tax imposed on the privilege of being
able to gratuitously transfer property during lifetime or upon death." The federal
transfer tax system taxes property passing from one generation to the next. The federal
transfer tax is imposed to the extent the property transferred exceeds the exemption
amounts." The 1999 exemption for the federal estate and gift tax is $650,000.67
and that person's children be allowed to lose it, thereby helping to keep a society in which a person
who is willing to work can get ahead whether well-born or not.
160. Bill Gates Personal Wealth Clock, (visited January 29, 1999) <http://www.webho.conV
wealthclock>.
161. This calculation is based on an annual compounding at 8% and does not take into consider-
ation the one-time federal estate and gift tax and generation-skipping transfer tax that will be imposed
on the transfer of the Gates' wealth. See infra note 171.
162. See supra note 159.
163. History has demonstrated that the accumulation of wealth by individuals prohibits members
outside that body of wealth from being represented at many levels. The poll tax is one example of
how the accumulation of wealth encroaches on one's constitutional rights. See Harper v. Virginia State
Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (analogizing discrimination based on wealth to that of race
discrimination).
164. See supra note 159.
165. I.R.C. § 2001.
166. There is currently a federal estate and gift tax exemption amount of $650,000. Since 1976,
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After the federal estate and gift tax exemption a transfer tax is imposed starting at 37%
up to 55%." The GSTT penalty is an additional flat tax at the maximum estate tax
rates imposed on property transferred more than one generation from the settlor
(skip transfer) to the extent said transfer exceeds the one million dollar GSTT exemp-
tion. 70
Abolishment legislation permits a trust to remain in existence in perpetuities
without regard to the Rule. Therefore settlors can skip generations indefinitely with
one of two options. Transfer amounts equal to the GSTI exemption and pay no GSTT
penalty or transfer property in excess of the GST" penalty and pay the one-time penal-
ty and avoid future transfer taxes.' The abolishment legislation places the federal
government in a position in which it imposes the only limitation on dead hand control.
The wealthy settlor can transfer one million dollars without any additional transfer tax.
Only transfers that exceed the GST" exemption may be discouraged from doing so in
light of the GSTT penalty." However, transfers in excess of the GSTT exemption
remain advantageous for wealthy settlors. The transfers in excess of the GSTT exemp-
the exemption amount is represented in the Internal Revenue Code by way of a unified credit. I.R.C.
§ 2010. See infra note 167. The unified credit is equivalent to the amount of tax that would be im-
posed on the federal estate and gift tax exemption. The generation transfer tax exemption amount is
$1,000,000. I.R.C. § 2631.
167. I.R.C. § 2010. The unified credit is a tax on the amount property is expected to increase to
$650,000 in 1999. The schedule under § 2010 provides:
In the case of descendents' dying,, The applicable exclusion amount is:
and gifts mAde, during: "
1998 $625,000
1999 $650,000
2000 and 2001 $675,000
2002 and 2003 $700,000
2004 $850,000
2005 $950,000
2006 and thereafter $1,000,000
Furthermore, by the year 2006, when the unified credit is expected to reach one million dollars,
wealthy settiors will be able to transfer one million dollars into a dynasty trust without any transfer
taxes.
168. I.R.C. § 2001.
169. The GSTI" tax is the taxable amount multiplied by the applicable rate. I.R.C. § 2602. The
applicable rate is the maximum federal estate and gift tax rate imposed on the transferor, currently
55%.
170. Every transferor is allowed a $1,000,000 exemption from the generation-skipping transfer tax
($2,000,000 in the case of a married couple). A GST" penalty is imposed on a skip transfer, regard-
less of how many generations are skipped. For example, if two million dollars were transferred from
settlor to grandchild the GST" penalty would be $550,000 (55% of the one million dollars that ex-
ceeded the GSTF exemption). If the two million dollars were placed in a dynasty trust, no additional
GSTr penalty would be imposed even if the $1,450,000 were left in trust to benefit future genera-
tions. This example does not take into consideration the federal estate and gift tax imposed on the
transfer. I.R.C. § 2001.
171. For example, the transfer of $1,000,000 of GSTF exempt assets invested at a growth rate of
8%, compounded annually, and assuming a federal estate tax and generation-skipping tax of 50%
(which was the maximum transfer tax at one time), will amount to $2,036,815,978 after 100 years. On
the other hand, the transfer of $1,000,000 of non-exempt GSTI" assets invested at the same rate of re-
turn, with the same federal estate tax, will amount to only $254,601,997 after the same period of time.
Lawrence J. Macklin, Address at NationsBank Private Client Group Presentation (June 26, 1998). This
example suggests that the penalty for this transferor is the difference between the transfer of exempt
GSIT" assets and non-exempt GSTI" assets equaling $1,782,213,981.
172. 1&
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tion are only subject to one federal estate tax and one GSTT penalty. Thqse transfers
that continue to pass down to indefinite future generations are never subject to an
additional transfer tax. Transfers may skip generations indefinitely without additional
cost.'73
4. The Abolishment Legislation Fails to provide beneficiaries with a means to
terminate
The abolishment legislation fails to mandate alternatives for termination. Trust
law makes it difficult for a beneficiary to terminate a dynasty trust."" Termination of
irrevocable trusts requires all competent beneficiaries to consent to the termination.'"
Termination can not be contrary to the settlor's intent and the trust purpose must be
accomplished. 76 Several problems arise with respect to termination of the dynasty
trust. First, it will be impossible to get all the beneficiaries in interest to consent.
77
Even if the beneficiaries were able to get around this requirement, 71 termination will
likely be contrary to the settlor's intent. At the trust's creation, the settlor's express in-
tent was to keep the trust ongoing in perpetuity. Secondly, spendthrift provisions' 7"
will be readily included to protect the unknown beneficiaries from the unknown credi-
tors.'" The inclusion of a spendthrift provision will further complicate the ability of
173. Id. The present law does not place limitations on the number of generations to be skipped by
the transferor. However, if the abolishment legislation is enacted readily throughout America by
wealthy settlors, as a means of avoiding transfer taxes, Congress could easily impose limitations on
dead hand control by limiting the number of generations that define a skip transfer. Furthermore, by
the year 2006, when the unified credit is expected to reach one million dollars, wealthy settlors will
be able to transfer one million dollars into a dynasty trust without any transfer taxes whatsoever.
174. Hills v. Travelers Bank & Trust Co., 7 A.2d 652 (Conn. 1939). The case involved the termi-
nation of a trust by the then-living beneficiaries. The trust provisions provided that the property placed
in trust by Mr. Hills would be distributed in the following manner: his wife, Mrs. Hills, would receive
income from the trust. Upon her death and if her sons had reached the age of thirty, the principal
would be divided equally among the sons. If either or both of the sons had predeceased the mother or
before the sons reached the age of thirty then the trust would be distributed to the son's issue in
equal shares and per stirpes. Twenty-three years after the husband's death, Mrs. Hills relinquished her
"right, title and interest in the trust estate." The sons then asked the trustee to distribute the principal
of the trust to them, and the trustee refused to do so.
The court sided with the trustee. The court reasoned that it does not have the authority to re-
make trust instruments, or to reduce or increase the size of gifts to beneficiaries because the court is
restrained by the donor's intent and, therefore, can only provide to the beneficiary what the decedent
wanted the beneficiary to have. In order for a trust to be terminated all interested parties must be ade-
quately represented and agree to the trust's termination. In this instance Mr. Hills' sons had a future
interest in the trust and their interests were not adequately represented since they did not have separate
representation from the sons. Therefore, the court would not allow beneficiaries with a vested interest
to shut out the existing or possible future interests by procuring a court decree for termination and
distribution among the present holders of vested interests.
The court also viewed distribution of the trust upon the death of Mrs. Hills as a primary pur-
pose of the trust as expressed by the decedent.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Dynasty trusts are generally created to provide for unbom beneficiaries. Despite the fact that
some jurisdictions may permit a guardian ad litem to be appointed to represent the unborn or permit
the living beneficiaries to consent, trust termination is a problem. See CAL PROB. CODE § 15405
(West 1991); Hatch v. Riggs National Bank, 361 F.2d 559 (DC. Cir. 1966).
178. Id.
179. The inclusion of a spendthrift provison is a per se material purpose. Culver v. Title Guarantee
& Trust Co., 70 N.E.2d 163 (N.Y. 1946).
180. In the additional-incentive jurisdiction the spendthrift provision will provide added protection
from settlor's creditors and will be most definitely employed. See Sullivan, supra note 129, at 463.
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the parties to terminate.' s1
The abolishment legislation's failure to provide termination by the living benefi-
ciaries in certain circumstances, regardless of settlor's initial intent and the existence of
a spendthrift provision could cost the beneficiaries dearly.' 2 Beneficiaries may be
forced to live with trust arrangements even if termination is in everyone's best interest.
Furthermore, beneficiaries may be forced to expend unnecessarily on legal fees and
court costs in an attempt to have a court of equity force trust termination. Moreover,
the costs of defending trust litigation will deplete trust assets and beneficiaries end up
paying for both sides of an up-hill battle. More often this will result in a no-win situa-
tion for the beneficiaries because the trust will not be terminated despite what is in the
best interest of the beneficiaries.
In addition to the relevant concerns of dead hand control previously mentioned,
other disadvantages include that the lack of contribution to social needs, debtor-creditor
issues, beneficiary resentment and uninformed forum shopping.
Dynasty trusts will prohibit beneficiaries from gifting property for social needs.
Property tied up in a dynasty trust will not be available for charitable purposes.' 3 It
is unlikely that the trustee will have the ability or desire to make charitable bequests
from trust assets.' Depending on the trust's dispositive provisions, the trustee may
refuse to distribute trust assets to a beneficiary to enable that beneficiary to make the
charitable bequest' This could mean that property, an ideal candidate for a school,
university, church or some other social need, would be deprived of the much-needed
benefits of charitable bequests.
As previously mentioned, dynasty trusts will likely include spendthrift provisions
either to protect settlors in additional-incentive jurisdictions" or to otherwise protect
beneficiaries. Limiting the beneficiary's ability to alienate trust assets causes harsh
consequences for creditors. Creditors will not be able to seize trust assets.8 ' Benefi-
ciaries will be equally disadvantaged and will be deprived of the ability to use property
as collateral. "
Beneficiaries of a dynasty trust may resent their inheritance being restricted in a
dynasty trust. Family harmony could be destroyed as a result of this resentment.' 9
181. See Culver, supra note 179.
182. Trust assets could be spent on unnecessary trustees' commissions.
183. Charitable trusts are exempt from the Rule. See DUKEMINIER, PROPERTY, supra note 22, at
300. Abolishment of the Rule removes one of the incentives of establishing trusts with charitable ben-
eficiaries. Thus, the wealthy settlor will be able to control property from his grave regardless of
whether he or she selects charitable or private beneficiaries.
184. Trustee's fees are generally calculated as a percentage of trust assets and trust net income.
See MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 14-103 (Supp. 1998). Therefore, the trustee will have no in-
centive to make needed charitable gifts, which would directly result in lower trustee commissions.
185. Id.
186. See supra Part V.B.2.
187. That is for obligtions other than for necessaries, public policy concerns like alimony and child
support and intentional torts. Bacardi v. White, 463 So.2d 218 (Fl. 1985); Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v.
Robertson, 65 A.2d 292 (Md. 1942) (Spendthrift trust provisions should not be extended to alimony
claims because the ex-spouse is a favored suitor and the claim is based upon strongest public policy
grounds); Lucas v. Lucas, 365 S.W.2d 372 (Tex. 1962) (public policy will not allow a spendthrift trust
beneficiary to be well taken care of when those who he has a legal duty to support must do without
such support); Dillon v. Dillon, 11 N.W.2d 628 (Wis. 1943) (public policy will not prohibit spendthrift
trust funds from being reached by a beneficiary's wife).
188. See DUKEMINIER, PROPERTY, supra note 22, at 226.
189. This resentment could be further complicated by a beneficiary/trustee's exercising discretionary
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Additionally, beneficiary resentment may result in litigation and additional expens-
es." Furthermore, beneficiaries may be without resources to litigate if inherited
wealth is tied up in dynasty trusts.
The decision to forum shop may be based solely on the ability to create a dynas-
ty trust without other considerations and could have detrimental affects on the benefi-
ciaries. Unlike wills, a trust can be created in any jurisdiction."" A settlor does not
have to be domiciled in the jurisdiction in which he creates an inter vivos trust."
Therefore settlors may attempt to minimize transfer taxes by creating an inter vivos
trust in an abolishment legislation jurisdiction. Settlors may be quick to act with out
weighing the disadvantages of the foreign jurisdiction. Disadvantages that may be
overlooked include the consideration of where suit would be brought by or against the
trustee and whether counsel will have to be retained in the abolishment legislation
jurisdiction.'93
In conclusion, if the abolishment legislation is not opposed,'" it will be enacted
in a majority of the jurisdictions.'" The only limitation imposed on the dead hand
control by these wealthy settlors is the GSTT penalty. If ever the transfer taxes were
repealed' the dead hand would have the ability to control property without any lim-
its whatsoever. However, the more likely consequence of the abolishment legislation
trend will be for Congress to take action and close the loophole by limiting the number
of generations to be skipped." This potential move by Congress will limit dead hand
control in excess of the GSTT exemption."
D. Advantages of the abolishment legislation
There is no question that the abolishment legislation offers advantages primarily
benefiting the wealthy with a means by which transfer taxes can be minimized. The
decisions contrary to the wishes of another beneficiary.
190. Some examples of additional expenses included legal expenses, court costs and other costs of
litigation such as discovery and hiring experts to testify.
191. Wilmington Trust Co. v. Wilmington Trust Co., supra note 88.
192. Id.
193. It is also possible that the settlor's attorney from the jurisdiction, which has not enacted the
abolishment legislation, may draft the document for the abolishment legislation. This practice of law by
an attorney outside the jurisdiction in which that attorney is licensed may constitute the unauthorized
practice of law in the abolishment jurisdiction. This author will further explore the unauthorized prac-
tice of law, as it relates to estate planning documents in a future article.
194. By the local bar association because of the estate planning opportunities it presents or by the
academic community because of their failure to be informed of the legislation as was the case with
the Maryland 1998 abolishment legislation.
195. New York, for example, depends on its trust capital, has more trust capital than any other
state and could not afford to lose its trust business to abolishment legislation jurisdictions. Therefore,
New York may be forced to enact such legislation to remain competitive in the trust capital business.
See Fraser, infra note 207.
196. Charles D. Fox, IV, Forward Into Battle: See Their Banners Go, 138 Tr. & Est. 24 (1999);
Jeffrey N. Pennell, Repeal? The Wealth Transfer Taxes?, 138 Tr. & EsL 52 (1999); Charles D. Fox,
To Repeal or Not To Repeal: Is It An Issue? Tr. & Est., 1998 WL 11601334.
197. Some scholars believe that curtailing dead hand control should not be Congress' responsibility
because Congress is interested in the federal fise, and in breaking up great fortunes and that dead
hand control is likely to have a low priority in Congressional concerns. DUKEMINIER, PROPERTY, supra
note 22, at 319.
198. This potential Congressional response to abolishment legislation will be explored in a future
article. It is this author's opinion that dead hand control will not be a low priority if dynasty trusts
are implemented throughout the United States so that settlors and his or her families are subject to
one federal transfer tax.
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abolishment legislation clearly provides an estate planning alternative for lawyers and
their wealthy clients. Additionally the abolishment legislation will provide potential
trust business resulting in additional income for the abolishment jurisdiction. Further-
more, the abolishment legislation carries out the settlor's intent.
1. Estate planning opportunities for wealthy clients
The abolishment legislation clearly provides estate planning benefits for wealthy
clients. It provides the rich with the ability to transfer wealth to future generations,
retain control over trust assets and pay a one time transfer tax and possible GSTT
penalty. The federal estate tax and generation skipping transfer tax advantages"
have motivated lawyers that represent wealthy clients to support the abolishment legis-
lation. Other jurisdictions may be forced to enact the abolishment legislation as their
only alternative to compete for trust business.2m Failure to give full consideration to
the consequences of allowing society to be controlled by the dead will result in addi-
tional abolishment legislation being enacted. Moreover, the transfer tax advantages
offered to wealthy individuals may force other jurisdictions"' to adopt the abolish-
ment legislation.
With a dynasty trust in an abolishment jurisdiction, wealthy settlors will transfer
property and such transfer will be subject to a transfer tax on the initial transfer and
never again. If the transfer exceeds the exemption amounts, a federal estate and gift
tax and or GSTT penalty will be imposed on the settlor or his or her estate, however,
no future generations will be subject to additional transfer taxes. Trust beneficiaries
will receive only a life estate in the trust assets there will be no transfer tax imposed
on the trust assets at the beneficiaries' deaths.'
2. The abolishment legislation is expected to generate income for the
abolishment jurisdiction
From an economic perspective the abolishment legislation generates trust busi-
ness in the abolishment jurisdiction, thus, additional income may further generate addi-
tional taxes for the jurisdiction. This additional income is currently beneficial to the
citizens of the abolishing state.
It is not surprising that South Dakota has enacted the abolishment legislation not
only to encourage the dead hand control settlors to its state, but also to encourage new
trust business within South Dakota. 3 In South Dakota wealthy families are creating
trust companies under the South Dakota statute. Changes in the Rule are fostering their
decisions to do so.2'
3. Preservation of settlor's intent to exercise dead hand control
The abolishment legislation honors the settlor's intent. Generally, rules of con-
199. For transfer tax explanation see supra Part V.C.3 of the text; see also Dukeminier, Dynasty
Trusts, supra note 10.
200. See supra note 195.
201. Id.
202. I.R.C. § 2031 (1994). With respect to the GSTT, see supra Part V.C.3, this is a 55% penalty
imposed on transfers that skip one or more generations. It is imposed on the initial skip transfer and
not subsequently imposed on future generations even if the transfer skips 20 generations
203. See supra Part V.B.2.c.
204. Brigid McMenamin, Trust Yourself, Forbes, October 12, 1998, at 62.
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struction and policy concerns mandate that the settlor's intent be carried out.2' Strict
adherence to the Rule departs from those rules of construction.2"
The preservation of the settlor's intent is important to encourage settlors to make
inter vivos gifts. If the Rule is imposed, the settlor's intent will be sacrificed and
settlors will be less inclined to make inter vivos gifts without the ability to exercise
dead hand control.
VI. Conclusion
The recent trend toward abolishment legislation ignores the policy that underlies
the Rule's compromise that property should be controlled by the living not the dead.
Lawmakers are willing to return to dead hand control in favor of wealthy settlors mini-
mizing transfer taxes.
Despite the fact that recent abolishment legislation requires the trustee to have
the mere ability to sell trust assets or discretionary right to terminate, there is no man-
datory requirement forcing the trustee to take such action. Absent an abuse of discre-
tion, it is unlikely that the courts will intervene to require the trustee to do otherwise,
even if the sale may be in the best interest of the beneficiaries.
Abolishment legislation fails to weigh the potential consequences of dead hand
control. Legislators are eliminating the Rule without good reasons for doing so. In
light of generous reform, abolishment is not necessary. The initial policy justifications,
which were instrumental in implementing the Rule will eventually return. Marketability
of trust assets will be frustrated despite the trustee's ability to sell or terminate The
rich will get richer and the poor will get poorer as a result of the dead hand control
perpetuating the concentration of wealth. The discouragement generated by the GSTI"
penalty will not be sufficient in light of the overall transfer tax advantages for the
wealthy settlor. This will eventually lead to devastating results for Americans.
Abolishment legislation is now present in seven jurisdictions. Many other juris-
dictions are considering abolishment legislation.2' Once the abolishment legislation
trend catches on and once jurisdictions begin to loose their trust business to neighbor-
ing jurisdictions, it will create a domino effect and additional jurisdictions will be
forced to abolish the rule to keep trust business with its boarders.
Before this trend progresses the legislators must recognize that the abolishment
legislation permits property rights to be controlled by the dead not the living, the poli-
cy concerns that underlie the Rule's compromise should not be ignored. The sacrifice
of dead hand control in exchange for another transfer tax loophole for the wealthy
settlor is outrageous. State legislators should not permit dead hand control to be left to
the federal government by way of the GST" penalty.
The elimination of the Rule and allowing one to control his or her property from
the grave over time will present harsh consequences. If at first glance, something
sounds too good to be true, it probably is. Abolishment legislation needs to be stopped
before it is too late.
205. Those rules of construction and policy considerations justify the enforcement of the spendthrift
trust. Broadway Nat'l Bank v. Adams, 133 Mass. 170 (1882).
206. Some scholars believe the object of the Rule is to defeat the settlor's intent. GRAY supra note
1; DUKEMINIER, PROPERTY, supra note 22, at 303.
207. Katharine Fraser, Trust-Friendly Legislation Urged for New York, AM. BANKER, February 9,
1998, at 8.
[Vol. 25:141
